We consider a one-to-one assignment problem consisting of matching n objects with n agents. Any matching leads to a utility vector whose n components measure the satisfaction of the various agents. We want to find an assignment maximizing a global utility defined as an ordered weighted average (OWA) of the n individual utilities. OWA weights are assumed to be non-increasing with ranks of satisfaction so as to include an idea of fairness in the definition of social utility. We first prove that the problem is NP-hard; then we propose a polynomial algorithm under some restrictions on the set of admissible weight vectors, proving that the problem belongs to XP.
propose inequality measures, fair social evaluation functions, and more generally decision models including an idea of fairness [24, 26, 31, 32, 35] . Although the descriptive power of these models is now widely acknowledged, their use in preference-based combinatorial optimization remains a challenging question. On the one hand we need efficient algorithms to determine fair optimal solutions; on the other hand, the computational complexity of fair optimization remains an open question for some well known combinatorial problems. In particular, this is the case for the one-to-one assignment problem and this is what motivated the study proposed in this paper.
We consider a one-to-one assignment problem that consists in distributing a set of n objects O = {o 1 , . . . , o n } to a set of n agents A = {a 1 , . . . , a n } (one object per agent and one agent per object) while maximizing the overall satisfaction of the agents. It is assumed that the satisfaction of each individual agent only depends on the item he/she receives and is independent of the items assigned to the other agents (no externality). We assume here that individual preferences are represented by utility functions 
Formally, an assignment can be represented by a one-to-one mapping π : A → O where π(a i ) = o j when o j is assigned to a i . The assignment π(a 1 ) = o 2 , π(a 2 ) = o 1 , π(a 3 ) = o 3 , π(a 4 ) = o 4 and π(a 5 ) = o 5 yields the utility vector u(π ) = (20, 5, 11, 11, 7) . The assignment π maximizes the sum of the satisfactions of the agents (and therefore, the average satisfaction) with a sum equal to 54. It can easily be obtained with the Hungarian algorithm [21] . However we observe that this solution is not very fair because the satisfaction vector is ill-balanced. Hence other assignments leading to better balanced utility vectors u(π ) = (u 1 (π ), . . . , u n (π )) are worth considering.
As far as fairness is concerned, a more attractive utility profile is obtained for assignment π defined by π (a i ) = o i for i = 1, . . . , 5. Although π is suboptimal in terms of average satisfaction (with a total score of 53), it could be checked that it is Pareto-optimal (no other assignment can improve one component without downgrading another one); moreover, the satisfaction vector u(π ) = (12, 12, 11, 11, 7) associated with π is much better balanced than u(π ). When passing from π to π , we improve the value of the worst component, and obtain a more balanced profile with 4 agents above 10, while marginally decreasing the average. We may even wish to maximize the satisfaction of the least satisfied agent (egalitarianism). Under this criterion, the optimal solution would be π (a 1 ) = o 5 , π (a 2 ) = o 2 , π (a 3 ) = o 1 , π (a 4 ) = o 4 and π (a 5 ) = o 3 with u(π ) = (8, 12, 8, 11, 8) ; every agent has utility of at least 8 but the average satisfaction is worse than for π or π .
In our example, solution π seems better than π and π . It achieves a good tradeoff between utilitarianism (measured by the sum of individual satisfactions) and egalitarianism (measured by the minimum satisfaction). The quality of this tradeoff can be assessed by a convex combination of the two criteria min and sum. In cases involving more than two agents, the distribution of satisfaction over the agents can be better described by considering not only the two initial criteria min and sum but also all partial sums of type L k (u(π )) = u u(π) , . . . , L n (u(π ))) is well known in majorization theory for inequality measurement [24] . It is also known in Social Choice theory [32] as the generalized Lorenz vector and used to define the L-dominance, a measure of relative inequalities on vectors having possibly different means. L-dominance is a strict preference relation defined on utility vectors by: u L u if L k (u ) ≥ L k (u) for k = 1 . . . n, one of these inequalities being strict (in other words this is the Pareto dominance over generalized Lorenz vectors) .
The relationship between L-dominance and fairness can be explained as follows: let u be the utility vector of a feasible solution such that u i > u j for two agents i, j in a multiagent problem, then for any other feasible utility vector u
We can see that the transformation ( -transfer) allowing to move from u to u reduces inequalities and improves the solution in terms of Lorenz dominance. To be more precise, it has been shown that u L u if and only if there exists a sequence of -transfers and Pareto-improvements allowing to pass from u to u [7, 18] . For example u = (12, 12, 11, 11, 7) L-dominates u = (20, 5, 6, 11, 8) due to the following improving sequence: (20, 5, 6, 11, 8 ) ≺ (20, 5, 7, 11, 7) ≺ (16, 5, 11, 11, 7) ≺ (12, 9, 11, 11, 7) ≺ (12, 12, 11, 11, 7) . We have used threetransfers and one Pareto-improvement but there is no need to find such a sequence explicitly. In view of [7, 18] , the fact that L(u ) = (7, 18, 29, 41 , 53) Pareto dominates L(u) = (5, 11, 19, 30, 50) implies the existence of an improving sequence from u to u . The notion of L-dominance is a refinement of Pareto dominance. Lorenz nondominated solutions are those Pareto-optimal solutions that cannot be improved in terms of -transfer. In this respect, they can be considered as "optimally fair".
However, Lorenz dominance is a partial order and many solutions are incomparable. In the initial example we have L(u(π )) = (5, 12, 23, 34, 54) whereas L(u(π )) = (7, 18, 29, 41, 53) . Hence none of the two vectors u(π ) and u(π ) Ldominates the other. A linear extension of L-dominance is obtained by measuring the social welfare as a weighted sum of the components of the Lorenz vector, for some positive coefficients. Applied to our framework, it amounts to defining a social welfare function as:
) with α k ≥ 0 thus generalizing the basic tradeoff between utilitarism and egalitarism. Now, by setting w i = n k=i α k and w = (w 1 , . . . , w n ), ψ can be rewritten using w as follows:
This aggregation function is an ordered weighted average (OWA) as defined in Yager [36] , applied to vector u(π ). Note that, by construction, the weights are such that w i ≥ w i+1 for all i < n. This is a direct consequence of the non-negativity of α k , k = 1, . . . , n, a necessary condition to be monotonically increasing with respect to Lorenz dominance and therefore, with -transfers. Thus the maximization of ψ w will favor fair solutions. For this reason, such an OWA function constructed with nondecreasing weights will be referred to as a fair OWA in the sequel. Coming back to the initial example, if α k = 1 for k = 1, . . . , 5, we obtain w i = 6−i and ψ w (u(π )) = 115 whereas ψ w (u(π )) = 148 which means that π is better than π . Actually, assignment π is ψ w -optimal for this vector w. Social utility functions defined with ψ w are known as generalized Gini socialevaluation functions in Social Choice theory and their axiomatic justification in terms of fairness is well established [32, 35] . The aim of this paper is to study the problem of determining an assignment maximizing such a fair OWA function.
In Sect. 2 we recall some known results about the optimization of fair OWA functions and the complexity of some particular instances of assignment problems. Section 3 addresses the issue of the complexity status of the problem, by providing a NP-hardness proof. Section 4 is devoted to the development of an efficient algorithm for the subclass of problems with weights featuring at most k distinct values. Some conclusions and perspectives for future research are given in Sect. 5.
The Fair OWA Assignment Problem
Let us consider an assignment problem with n agents and n objects. The fair OWA assignment problem is an optimization problem and the corresponding decision problem can be stated as follows:
Fair owa multiagent assignment problem (FOWAMA) instance: A pair (U, w), where U is an integer-valued square matrix of size n, w is a vector of size n of non-negative and non-increasing weights (i.e., w i ≥ w i+1 , i = 1, . . . , n − 1), and a positive rational number Q. question: Does there exist an assignment (i.e., a one-to-one mapping π ) such that ψ w (u(π )) ≥ Q, ψ w being defined as in Equation (2)? In the above problem, the vector of weights w is part of the instance. Various polynomial cases have been exhibited in the literature. For example, when w = (1, . . . , 1), i.e., when the sum of individual utilities is to be maximized, the well known Hungarian algorithm [21] solves the problem in polynomial time. Also, when w = (1, 0, . . . , 0), OWA boils down to the minimum and this corresponds to bottleneck optimization, a well-known polynomial case [11] . The linear combination of bottleneck optimization and max-sum optimization corresponding to weights of type w = ( p, 1, . . . , 1) with p > 1 is also solvable in polynomial time [25] . When w = (1, . . . 1, 0, . . . , 0), OWA reduces to a single Lorenz component L k and the problem is known as the k-sum assignment problem; it can be solved in polynomial time [17] . When all the differences w i − w i+1 are sufficiently large, OWA optimization is equivalent to leximin optimization, another polynomial case solved in Sokkalingam et al. [33] . Finally, if we relax the non-negativity constraints on the weights, another case corresponding to w = (1, 0, . . . , 0, −1) has been considered in Gupta et al. [16] to solve the so-called minimum-deviation problem; here also, the problem is proved to be polynomial.
Despite the fact that various polynomial cases are known, the complexity of the fair OWA multiagent problem has been until now an open question. There are NPhardness results for the one-to-many OWA maximum assignment problem version, see e.g. [4, 13] but the proofs do not apply to the one-to-one assignment problem. Finally, nice linearizations of the OWA operator have been proposed to reformulate OWA optimization problems in the language of linear programming [2, 5, 29] . However, in all cases, applying these techniques on the fair OWA multiagent assignment problem requires to solve a mixed integer program, which does not tell us anything on the complexity of the problem. In the next section we prove that the FOWAMA problem is NP-complete.
Complexity of the FOWAMA Problem
In order to prove that the FOWAMA problem is NP-complete we describe a polynomial-time many-one reduction (a.k.a. Karp reduction) of MAX3SAT to FOWAMA, the former problem being defined as follows (see [10] ):
. . , C m } of clauses over X such that each clause C i ∈ C has 3 literals, and a positive integer R ≤ m. question: Is there a truth assignment for X that simultaneously satisfies at least R clauses in C?
Because solving any instance of the 3-SAT problem (which is NP-complete [8] ) is equivalent to deciding whether the corresponding MAX3SAT instance with R = m (m being the number of clauses) admits a truth assignment satisfying all clauses, MAX3SAT is also NP-complete. We now introduce a reduction from MAX3SAT to FOWAMA.
Reduction from MAX3SAT to FOWAMA
Let M = {1, . . . , m} and P = {1, . . . , p} be the set of indices for clauses and variables, respectively. In order to reduce the MAX3SAT problem to the FOWAMA problem, we are going to associate to any instance of MAX3SAT a bipartite graph G = (V, E), where V is a set of 12m vertices partitioned into 6m agent-vertices and 6m objectvertices and E is a subset of edges to be defined below.
For any variable x i , let s Overall we obtain 2 i∈M s i = 6m agent-vertices. Moreover, for any clause C j , j ∈ M we define three "true" object-vertices respectively denoted t * j , t 1 j , t 2 j and 3 "false" object-vertices respectively denoted f 1 j , f 2 j , f 3 j . Hence, we also obtain a set of 6m object-vertices. Assuming that the three variables occurring in C j are x i , x k , x l , we denote G j the subgraph of G reduced to vertices associated with clause C j defined in Fig. 1 .
The set of agents-vertices of G j is A j = {a
We will show later that by setting to zero the utilities of edges in A i × O l for any l = i, the overall assignment of objects in O to agents in A amounts to solving a series of m interdependent assignment problems on pairs
Let us explain now the connection between solutions to the assignment problem on the graph G j and truth assignments of variables x i , x k , x l occurring in clause C j in this order. Here also, some edges are irrelevant to model truth assignments and are penalized in order to be excluded from any optimal assignment. This is done by assigning zero utility value to such edges. The edge set of G j is constructed as follows: each of the true vertices Figure 1 shows the only edges with nonzero utility in G j .
Any solution of the 6 × 6 assignment problem on G j ( Fig. 1 ) corresponds to a truth assignment of variables x i , x k , x l satisfying clause C j . The truth value of variable x i is derived as follows: if object f 1 j is assigned to agent a j i (resp.ā j i ) then x i = false (resp. x i = true). A similar rule applies for x k (resp. x l ) using object f 2 j (resp. f 3 j ). Note that there may exist several assignments representing the same truth values for x i , x k , x l due to the freedom left in the choice of true-objects assigned to agents. Now, if we consider all clauses simultaneously, it may be the case that partial assignments determined independently on the various subgraphs G j , j = 1, . . . , m may not correspond to a consistent truth-assignment of all variables. A variable x i may be true in clause G j but false in clause C k . We are going to show that there exists a specific choice of utilities and OWA weights ensuring the overall consistency of 
truth-assignments corresponding to the optimal solutions of the FOWAMA instance, whenever the MAX3SAT instance is satisfiable. We explain below the construction of such utilities and weights for any arbitrary instance of MAX3SAT.
Definition of utilities and OWA weights First, let us mention that the utility of the edges in E linking two vertices of two distinct subgraphs G j , G k , j = k is set to 0. This is used to penalize any assignment of an object of O k to an agent of A j . The utility values for the other edges are chosen sufficiently large to ensure that no OWA-optimal assignment will use one of these edges, as will be shown later. We now define the utilities of the edges of subgraphs G j , j ∈ M. Recall that an edge represents the possibility of matching an object to an agent. Therefore, the utility of an edge represents the utility of the object for the agent under consideration. If clause C j includes variables x i , x k , x l in this order, i = 1, j = 1, l = 1, then the utilities of the edges linking a Tables 1, 2 and 3 . If one of the indices i, j, k is equal to 1, the corresponding table is modified by replacing its first line with the one given in Table 4 . Table 4 Utilities of edges involving agent-vertices associated with variable x 1
Note that, in Tables 1, 2 and 3, some utilities are set to 0. This is to penalize the edges that do not appear in Fig. 1 ; they are indeed irrelevant to interpret an assignment in G as a truth-assignment.
Let us explain the range of possible non-zero utility values representing the satisfactions of agents {a j 1 ,ā j 1 }, j ∈ S 1 (agents concerned with the truth assignment of variable x 1 ). For agentā j 1 , non-zero utilities range from 2 6m to 2 6m+m + 2 2m . The lower utility value follows from assigning the false object f k j to agentā j 1 where x 1 (or ¬x 1 ) is the k-th literal of C j . The higher utility value follows from assigning the true object t * j to agentā j 1 where x 1 (or ¬x 1 ) is a literal of C j . For agent a j 1 , non-zero utilities range from 2 6m+3m to 2 6m+4m + 2 5m . The lower utility value follows from assigning the false object f k j to agent a j 1 where x 1 (or ¬x 1 ) is the k-th literal of C j . The higher utility value follows from assigning the true object t * j to agent a j 1 where x 1 (or ¬x 1 ) is a literal of C j . Similarly the range of possible non-zero utility can be defined for the agents concerned with the truth assignment of the other variables x i , i > 1. Table 5 summarizes the ranges of possible non-zero utilities for the different groups of agents:
Remark 1 From the above construction, it is seen that two intervals of possible utility values corresponding to two distinct variables never overlap. Hence, for any assignment π providing all agents with a strictly positive utility, the components of the sorted utility vector u ↑ (π ) necessarily appear according to the following sequence: 
i=1 s i the smallest rank of a term of type a j k . These indices will be useful to determine the smallest individual utility obtained within specific groups of agents. For example u
Finally we specify the weights w k that will be used to define the OWA aggregation functions:
Note that these weights decrease as k increases from 1 to 6m.
Preliminary Results
Let us introduce the concept of consistent assignment in G, that can be associated to a truth-assignment of variables in MAX3SAT.
Definition 1 An assignment π in G is said to be consistent if for any i ∈ P one of the two following cases occurs :
is matched with the object f l j , l being the position (1, 2, 3) of variable x i in clause C j , (ii) for all j ∈ S i agentā j i is matched with an object belonging to {t * j , t 1 j , t 2 j } and a j i is matched with the object f l j , l being the position (1, 2, 3) of variable x i in clause C j .
The first case (i) corresponds to the assignment x i = true in all clauses C j involving an occurrence of x i . Similarly, the second case (ii) corresponds to the assignment x i = false in all clauses C j involving an occurrence of x i . So, it is possible to associate with any consistent assignment π , a truth assignment x π of the boolean variables X such that for any i ∈ P, x π i = true iff for all j ∈ S i agentā j i is matched with an object belonging to {t * j ,
) matched with an object t * j in assignment π , and let q π = i∈P q π i . Note that for any i ∈ P such that x π i = true we have q π i ≤ s + i and therefore, q π i < s
Hence, in both cases we have q π i < s i . We now establish the following Lemma:
Proof Let z be the utility vector of the consistent assignment π . Note that all components of z are strictly positive since no edge with utility zero belongs to a consistent assignment, by definition. Due to Remark 1, the s 1 first components of z ↑ correspond to the satisfaction of agents in {ā j 1 , j ∈ S 1 } and the s 1 next components correspond to the satisfaction of agents in {a
Thus, whatever the truth value assigned to x π 1 , we obtain:
Using similar arguments, it can be shown that for i > 1 we have:
Hence,
Corollary 1 Any consistent assignment π is such that ψ w (u(π )) ≥ K .
We want to prove now that a OWA-optimal assignment of objects to agents only uses edges with non-zero utility. To this end we make the following preliminary remarks:
Remark 2 For any assignment π , for any index i ∈ P, the least satisfied agent in {a j i , j ∈ S i } receives an object with utility not larger than 2 6im+4m , and the least satisfied agent in {ā j i , j ∈ S i } receives an object with utility not larger than 2 6im+m . Let j ∈ S + i and k ∈ S − i . Then the maximal possible utility obtained for agentā j i (resp. a k i ) results from the assignment of object t * j (resp. t * k ), see Tables 1, 2 , 3 and 4, and is equal to 2 6im+m (resp. 2 6im+4m ).
Remark 3
We recall that the set of clauses C admits at least one positive and one negative occurrence of x i (otherwise the variable can be instanciated and eliminated). Therefore, there exist at least 2 p literals in C; hence, m ≥ 2 p/3 and therefore, p ≤ 3m/2. 
Proof From Remark 2, we know that the lowest utility of an agent belonging to {ā j 1 , j ∈ S 1 } is bounded above by 2 6m+m . So we can state that u
. We know that utilities of the agents belonging to {ā j 1 , j ∈ S 1 } are bounded above by 2 6m+m +2 2m (see Table 4 ). So we have u
. From Remark 2, we know that the lowest utility of an agent belonging to {a j 1 , j ∈ S 1 } is bounded above by 2 6m+4m . So we can state that u ↑ α 1 (π ) ≤ 2 10m . We also know that utilities of the agents belonging to {a j 1 , j ∈ S 1 } are bounded above by 2 6m+4m + 2 5m (see Table  5 ). So we have u
. More generally we know from Remark 2 that for all i ∈ P we have u
Lemma 3
Any assignment π such that at least one agent is matched with a zero utility object is such that ψ w (u(π )) < K , K being defined by Eq. 5.
Proof Let π be an assignment whose utility vector u(π ) contains at least one component 0. We first determine an upper bound on ψ w (u(π )). By hypothesis, we have u ↑ 1 (π ) = 0 because the utility values are all non-negative. Furthermore, by Lemma 2 we have u
. . , 6m. Hence, using weights defined in Eq. (4), we obtain :
The first three terms in (9) are straightforward. The term 2 · 2 4m ( p − 1) comes from the 2( p − 1) terms of the form 2 −6im+3m u
by bᾱ i and b α i respectively; we obtain 2 −6im+3m u
). Finally the term (6m −2s 1 −2 p +2)(2 2m + 2 m ) comes from the remaining (6m−2s 1 −2 p+2) terms, either of the form 2 −6im u
. . , p}, each of them being equal to 2 2m + 2 m .
Finally, to prove that ψ w (u(π )) < K let us consider the quantity: K = (s 1 − 1)2 7m + 2 10m + 2 4m ( p − 1). Using Eq. (5) we have:
Moreover, by Eq. (9) we obtain:
By Remark 3 we know that p ≤ 3m/2 ≤ 2m. Moreover, we have s 1 ≤ m. Finally, we assume that m ≥ 4 (to simplify the proof, smaller instances are irrelevant in view of our complexity analysis). Under these conditions, we obtain the following inequalities:
Therefore, we get:
Hence, by adding Eqs. (10) and (11) we obtain ψ w (u(π )) < K .
We have shown in Corollary 1 that any consistent assignment π is such that ψ w (u(π )) ≥ K . One can construct a consistent assignment by assigning items to agents according to (i) of Definition 1. This consistent assignment corresponds to the truth-assignment where all variables are set to true. Since a consistent assignment exists for any instance, we deduce that any optimal assignment is such that ψ w (u(π )) ≥ K . Hence, Lemma 3 shows that any assignment providing at least one agent with a zero utility object is suboptimal. Therefore, any optimal assignment π leads to a utility vector u(π ) with strictly positive components. Let us introduce now a fourth Lemma:
Lemma 4 Any assignment π yielding a strictly positive utility vector u(π ) and such that ψ w (u(π )) ≥ K is consistent.
Proof By contraposition we want to prove that, for any assignment π yielding a strictly positive utility vector u(π ), if π is not consistent then ψ w (u(π )) < K . Let π be an assignment with strictly positive utility vector u(π ). Hence, every false object f l j ( j ∈ M, l ∈ {1, 2, 3}) is assigned either to agent a j i or to agentā j i where x i is the variable appearing in position l in clause C j (otherwise we would obtain a zero component in u(π ) by definition of the utility functions, see Tables 1, 2 , 3 and 4 and Fig. 1 ). Since π is not consistent, there exists at least one variable for which truth assignments are not consistent. Let i be the smallest variable index for which such an inconsistency appears. The inconsistency is characterized by the existence of two false objects f l q and f k t assigned to a q i andā t i , respectively, where x i is a variable appearing both in position l in clause C q and in position k in clause C t . From Tables  1, 2 and u 6rm+4m . We claim that it is impossible to reach these two upper bounds with the same assignment π . Indeed to get u ↑ α r (π ) = 2 6rm+m and u ↑ α r (π ) = 2 6rm+4m , no false item must be assigned to an agent in {ā j r , j ∈ S r } nor to an agent in {a j r , j ∈ S r }. But in that case, there exists a false object f d j for some j ∈ S r , corresponding to the occurrence of x r in C j which would not be assigned toā j r nor to a j r . Hence, the assignment of this object would induce a zero utility which yields a contradiction with the assumption that u(π ) is strictly positive. This implies that in the best cases, we have u 
Moreover, using a similar reasoning for r = 1 we obtain:
Finally, we know that for any j ∈ S 1 , one of the two agentsā j 1 and a j 1 should receive a false object. So half of the agents of {a j 1 ,ā j 1 , j ∈ S 1 } should receive a false object. If a false object is assigned to an agent in {ā j 1 , j ∈ S 1 } except the least satisfied of them it yields a utility of 2 6m+3m that will be multiplied by the weight 2 −3m in the computation of ψ w (u(π )); if a false object is assigned to an agent in {a j 1 , j ∈ S 1 } except the least satisfied of them it yields a utility of 2 6m that will be multiplied by the weight 2 0 in the computation of ψ w (u(π )). So in both cases, the weighted contribution of the agent in the OWA computation is 2 6m . Using this for all but two agents in S 1 and using Eqs. (12) and (13), and inequalities u (8), we obtain the following inequality under the assumption that i = 1 (the case i = 1 will be treated separately at the end of the proof):
In the right-hand side of (14) , the term 2 9m + 2 10m directly follows from (13) . Since i = 1 there is no inconsistency for variable x 1 . Therefore, either all agents of the set {ā j 1 , j ∈ S 1 } or all agents of the set {a j 1 , j ∈ S 1 } receive a false object, thus inducing a contribution to ψ w (u(π )) at least equal to 2 6 m(s 1 − 1) (there are s 1 such agents but the contribution of one of them is already included in the term 2 9m + 2 10m ). For the remaining agents in {ā
and Eq. (8) which yields a contribution of (s 1 − 1)2 7m + 2 2m . This completes the arguments concerning the contribution of the agents belonging to {ā j 1 , j ∈ S 1 } and those belonging to {a j 1 , j ∈ S 1 }. Let us consider now the satisfaction of agents in {ā
corresponding to the contribution of the least satisfied pair of agent (one in each of these two sets). Then, using Eq. (12) for all r ∈ P\{1, i} we obtain:
Finally, for all remaining agents, we use inequalities u (8) . This completes the explanation of Eq. (14) .
Finally, to prove that ψ w (u(π )) < K let us consider the quantity: K = 2 10m + 2 9m + (s 1 − 1)(2 7m + 2 6m ) + ( p − 2)(2 4m + 2 3m ) + 2 3m . Using Eq. (5) we have:
Moreover, by Eq. (14) we have:
According to Remark 3, we know that p ≤ 3m/2 holds; we also assume that m ≥ 5.
Hence we obtain the following inequalities:
. Therefore, we have:
Hence, by adding Eqs. (15) and (16) we obtain ψ w (u(π )) < K . We consider now the case i = 1 where the proof follows a similar line with minor variations. In this case, the following inequality is substituted for (14):
. (17) We have indeed wᾱ 1 u
. Then, using Eq. (12) for all r ∈ P\{1} we obtain:
Finally, for all other terms, we use the same arguments as in the explanation of Eq. (14) . Now, to prove that ψ w (u(π )) < K when i = 1 let us consider the quantity:
). Using Eq. (5) we have:
Moreover, by Eq. (17) we have:
As in previous Lemma we have 2 p ≤ 3m and we assume that m ≥ 4. Hence we obtain the following inequalities: 2 9m + s 1 2 2m + 2 7m − 2 6m + (2 2m + 2 m )(6m − 2s 1 + 2 p + 2) < 2 9m + 2 6m + m(2 2m + 2 2m+3 + 2 m+3 ) < 2 9m + 2 6m + m · 2 2m+5 < 2 9m + 2 6m + 2 5m < 2 9m + 2 7m < 2 9m+1 < 2 10m . Therefore, we have:
Hence, by adding Eqs. (18) and (19) we obtain ψ w (u(π )) < K .
We can now establish the complexity of the FOWAMA problem.
NP-Completeness of FOWAMA Theorem 1 The FOWAMA problem is NP-complete.
Proof First we show that the FOWAMA problem belongs to NP, and for this we have to check that we can compute the OWA value of any assignment in G in polynomial time. For this, we observe that in view of the definition of the utilities and of the weights, all the numbers involved have polynomial size representation (they are all representable with no more than 6 pm + 5m + 1 binary digits). Moreover, since all the weights are powers of 2, each product of a weight and a utility can be obtained as a result of shifting the binary representation of the utility. This shows that (i) the construction of the FOWAMA instance is a polynomial-size many-one reduction having size polynomial in the size of the initial MAX3SAT instance; (ii) computing the OWA value can be done in polynomial time. To show that the problem is NP-complete we use the reduction from MAX3SAT introduced in Sect. 3.1 which is obviously polynomial. Let us consider any instance of MAX3SAT. The question is: is there a truth assignment that simultaneously satisfies at least R clauses in C? To answer this question, we consider the following instance of FOWAMA: is there an assignment π in the graph G such that ψ w (u(π )) ≥ K + 2 2m R, where w is defined by (4) and K is defined by (5)? First we observe that from any truth assignment of variables (x 1 , . . . , x p ) which satisfies at least R clauses, we can construct a consistent assignment π such that ψ w (u(π )) ≥ K + 2 2m R. This is easily proved by using similar arguments as in the proof of Lemma 1.
Conversely, let us prove that if an assignment π exists such that ψ w (u(π )) ≥ K +2 2m R then there exists a truth assignment of variables (x 1 , . . . , x p ) which satisfies at least R clauses. Since the overall value is greater than K , we know that π is consistent by Lemma 4. By Lemma 1 we know that ψ w (u(π )) = K +2 2m q π . Since ψ w (u(π )) ≥ K + 2 2m R we obtain R ≤ q π . Then, the truth-assignment x π associated with the consistent assignment π makes at least q π clauses true. Therefore, at least R clauses are true in this assignment, and this completes the proof of Theorem 1.
The above result suggests that the existence of polynomial-time algorithms for exactly solving the fair OWA assignment problem is highly unlikely. This therefore makes the investigation of polynomial-time solvable special cases particularly worth considering. The purpose of the next section is precisely to exhibit a wide class of such problem instances. 
Moreover, w is such that for any i ∈ K and any j ∈ {λ i−1 + 1, . . . , λ i }, w j = μ i . Observe that it may be the case that λ k < n; this means that w i = 0 for all i ∈ {λ k + 1, . . . , n}.
Under these assumptions about the weights, the OWA function ψ w can be reformulated using μ and λ as follows:
Now, we propose an algorithm for the k-FOWAMA problem to find an assignment π maximizing ψ μ,λ (u(π )), where the utility matrix U is supposed to be given.
A Recursive Algorithm Solving the k-FOWAMA Problem
Starting from the initial instance of size n with k distinct weights, the algorithm is recursive and the current step consists in splitting the problem into at most n 2 subproblems of size n, each involving only k − 1 distinct weights. Then instances of size k − 1 are recursively split until k = 1. The optimum is then recovered from the optimal solutions of subproblems. The number of calls to the main procedure is bounded above by n 2k which remains polynomial for fixed k. We first explain the base case k = 1 and eventually consider the general case.
The case k = 1 corresponds to a situation where the λ 1 first weights of the OWA operator equal μ 1 , the others (if λ 1 < n) being equal to 0. This base case is solved by maximizing
e., the λ th 1 component of the Lorenz vector L(u(π )), for π ∈ (N ). This base problem can be solved in polynomial time, as shown in Gupta et al. [17] , using the following procedure: for any threshold value t for utilities, one considers the variantû t of u where all utility values greater than t are set to t. Then if π t denotes the max-sum assignment (computed e.g. with the Hungarian algorithm) for
for more details see Theorem 1 in Gupta et al. [17] . Since (N ) is nothing else but the union of sets {π ∈ (N ) : u ↑ λ 1 (π ) = t} for all utility values t, the maximization of L λ 1 (u(π t )) over all t yields the optimal assignment π * . Indeed, for any other assignment π , we have
). With our notation, the algorithm is described by Algorithm 1 below.
When k > 1 we have to optimize an OWA with k strictly positive distinct values (μ 1 , . . . , μ k ) appearing in the sequence (w i ) i∈N . We want to reduce the problem to a family of OWA assignment subproblems with k − 1 distinct values (μ 1 , . . . ,μ k−1 ). To this end we consider subproblems whereμ i = μ i /μ k−1 for i = 1, . . . , k − 1. The subproblems are characterized by different variants of the utility functions defined as follows: for any utility value t, one considers the variantû t of u where all utility values smaller than or equal to t are redefined asû 
Correctness and Complexity of Algorithm 2
Let us first show that Algorithm 2 returns an OWA-optimal assigment. We first establish a preliminary Lemma showing that the transformation of utilities from u toû t preserves the ordering of agents over components, i.e., more formally:
Proof Three cases must be distinguished depending on the position of t with respect to u i (π ) and u j (π ).
In this case we have:
Case 2 u i (π ) > t ≥ u j (π ). In this case we haveû
Remark 4 For the sake of simplicity, when a particular t is considered, the utilityû t is simply denotedû hereafter.
A direct consequence of Lemma 5 is the following:
Proposition 1 For any utility value t,û ↑ = (û t ) ↑ can be directly derived from u ↑ , for any assignment π , as follows:
Proof Lemma 5 shows that the same permutation of agents sorts vectors u(π ) and u(π ) by increasing order. Hence for all i ∈ N the transformation from u (21) is identical to the transformation from u i (π ) toû i (π ) performed in Algorithm 2, formally given by:
We establish now two lemmas that will allow us to prove that the output of Algorithm 2 is OWA-optimal with respect to the initial vector of weights (characterized by μ and λ).
Proof Let π be an assignment such that u
In particular, for π we have, using (20) :
By definition of v, u
. Note also thatλ i = λ i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 2}. Hence we can rewrite the left hand side of (23) as follows:
Moreover, sinceλ k−1 = λ k > λ k−1 we have:
Hence by substituting the rightmost term of line (24) by the latter line, the left-hand side of Eq. (23) becomes:
Similarly, we can prove that the right-hand side of Eq. (23) is:
Hence we obtain L ≥ R by Eq. (23) . Note now that by definition of π we have u
Therefore, the rightmost term of R can be rewritten using the following equality:
which gives the following reformulation:
Moreover, we can state that for any j ∈ {λ k−1 + 1, . . . , λ k } we haveû
. To this end, two possible cases must be distinguished depending on the value of u
t and t = v we have:
where the inequality comes from the fact that μ k−1 > μ k and u
Therefore, the rightmost term of L can be lower bounded using the following inequality:
Hence we obtain ψ μ,λ (u(π )) − S ≥ L which, in addition to L ≥ R, completes the proof.
Lemma 7
Let t < v such that t = u i (o j ) for some i, j ∈ N , then allocation π t as defined in Algorithm 2 maximizes ψ μ,λ (u(π )) over the set {π ∈ (N )|u
Proof Let π be an allocation such that u λ (u(π ) ). In Algorithm 2, π t is obtained by a call to Solve(û t ,μ,λ, n, k − 1). Hence π t maximizes ψμ ,λ (û(π )) for π ∈ (N ). In particular, for π we have using (20) :
Furthermore, by definition of π , we know that for any j ∈ {1, . . . , λ k−1 }, we have u
Hence, as in the proof of Lemma 6, the right hand-side of Eq. (27) can be rewritten as :
Moreover, by definition of π , we know that for any j
Hence we have :
which give the following reformulation:
Besides, we can state thatû
There are indeed two possible cases depending on the value of u 
where the inequality is due to t < u ↑ j (π t ) and μ k < μ k−1 . For the same reason we can state the following:
where the inequality is due to u (27):
Therefore, we have ψ μ,λ (u(π t )) − S ≥ L which, in addition to L ≥ R, completes the proof.
Now, thanks to the previous two lemmas, we are able to provide the time complexity for Algorithm 2 to solve an OWA optimal assignment provided that OWA weights are non-increasing and include no more than k distinct values. Lemma 7 we know that ψ μ,λ (u(π t )) ≥ ψ μ,λ (u(π )), where π t is the assignment found at step t = u ↑ λ k−1 +1 (π ). Finally, we know that the assignment π * returned by Algorithm 2 is such that ψ μ,λ (u(π * )) ≥ ψ μ,λ (u(π t )) for any assignment π t founded during the algorithm. Hence we clearly have ψ μ,λ (u(π * )) ≥ ψ μ,λ (u(π )) for any π ∈ (N ).
Let us show now, by induction on k that Algorithm 2 runs in O(n 2k+3 ). For k = 1, Algorithm 1 solves the problem in O(n 5 ) according [17] , assuming that standard assignment subproblems are solved in O(n 3 ) e.g. using the Edmonds and Karp algorithm [9] . So the hypothesis holds for k = 1. Now, assume that the complexity of finding an assignment which maximizes an OWA with k − 1 different weights is O(n 2(k−1)+3 ). In Algorithm 2, the value v = max π ∈ (N ) {u ↑ λ k−1 (π )} can be computed in O(n 3 log(n)) using the algorithm proposed in Gorski et al. [14] . In Algorithm 2 the first loop is performed in linear time. For the second loop, the number of possible values for t is bounded above by n 2 . The number of steps for the inner loop is bounded above by n 2 . Then comes a call to Solve(û t ,μ,λ, n, k − 1) that runs in O(n 2(k−1)+3 ) by induction hypothesis. Overall, the complexity of the main loop is O(n 2k+3 ). This is also the complexity of the whole algorithm.
Therefore, the complexity of Algorithm 2 is exponential in k, but the algorithm becomes polynomial for k bounded by a fixed constant. This algorithm shows that FOWAMA belongs to the complexity class XP. However, membership of FOWAMA in FPT (i.e., deciding whether this problem can be solved in time n c 2 O(k) , where c is a constant value) remains an open problem.
Conclusion
In the first part of the paper, we have proved NP-completeness of FOWAMA, the decision problem associated with the search for an OWA-optimal assignment. In spite of the existence of many known polynomial cases, this issue has been an open problem until now. It is worth noting that this result also implies NP-hardness of the optimal assignment problem w.r.t. a concave Choquet integral (see e.g. [22] ) since it includes FOWAMA as a special case.
In the second part of the paper, we have proposed a polynomial time algorithm to solve the fair OWA multiagent assignment problem under some restriction on the weight vector. This result shows that FOWAMA belongs to XP but membership in FPT remains an open question. Besides this, another question deserving investigation would be to study polynomial cases for the determination of an optimal assignment with respect to other aggregation functions, more general than OWA, and used to express fairness, e.g., weighted OWA [34] and Choquet integrals [30] .
